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Abstract - Since sensor nodes suffer from limited
resources, in memory storage, computing power, energy
capabilities, and transmission rates, available network
security protocols are inadequate. Symmetric algorithms
cannot provide the same degree of security as public-key
algorithms, the fact of which has led us to devise a new
algorithm, SHESP, which uses public keys within the
limitations of sensor nodes. This paper aims to present a
way to utilize existing public-key algorithms in the field of
wireless sensor network security by dividing the network
into clusters. Our algorithm supplies data confidentiality,
node authentication and data integrity while remaining
within acceptable memory, time and energy constraints.
Also, an important feature we opted to establish, which was
lacking in most security protocols, was enabling secure
node-to-node communication, without the need to route
through a distant base station. We provide theoretical as
well as experimental evidence to validate our algorithm.
Keywords: Sensor Networks, Energy Efficiency, Security
Protocol, Public Keys, Clustering
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Introduction and Related Work

Sensor nodes are deployed in harsh physical conditions, and
are required to transmit sensitive data, so securing the data
transmitted through WSNs is important to maintain the
confidentiality of the data and authenticate the sensor nodes
participating in the network. Most protocols opt to use
symmetric cryptography, because it is less expensive than
public key algorithms. It is possible to use a single global
secret key that is shared by the base station and all the
sensor nodes, but that becomes useless if a node is
compromised by a malicious adversary, and the entire
network can become vulnerable to attacks. In other
scenarios, the base station shares a distinct pair-wise key
with every sensor node in the network, but that requires a lot
of overhead and usually does not scale well. Also, to enable
node-to-node communication, nodes would have to resort to
a pair-wise key sharing, which is not efficient since it
requires the storage of (n-1) keys in each node in an n-node
network, and the addition (or deletion) of nodes dynamically
requires establishing (or removing) shared keys with all the
nodes in the network. The main problem with using
symmetric keys is their secure establishment between the
nodes without being detected by an outside attacker, which
would often require either pre-deployment actions to
bootstrap the keys or the involvement of a base station to

distribute the keys. Thus, symmetric algorithms cannot
provide the same degree of security as public-key
algorithms, the fact of which has led to a new trend in
finding ways to use public keys within the limitations of
sensor nodes. Our research aims to present a way to utilize
existing public-key algorithms such as RSA, DiffieHellmann, and Elliptic Curve in the field of wireless sensor
network security. By dividing the nodes in the network into
clusters, asymmetric encryption and decryption can be
applied in the nodes chosen to be clusterheads. The use of
asymmetric cryptography permits the establishment of
symmetrically secure channels between nodes and their
clusterheads, as well as allowing node-to-node
communication within the network. Our algorithm provides
confidentiality, node authentication, and data integrity while
remaining within acceptable memory, time and energy
constraints. Most existing protocols utilize the
computational simplicity of symmetric algorithms to
implement security in Wireless Sensor Networks. The most
prominent algorithm is SPINS [1], which was developed at
Berkeley; it uses RC5 for encryption and depends on two
building blocks: SNEP, to provide data confidentiality
through encryption, authentication with Message
Authentication Codes (MAC) and freshness by use of
counters, and µTESLA, for authenticated broadcast.
However, such protocols require pre-deployed keys which
affect scalability and node-to-node communication can only
be achieved by going through the base station. Another
protocol was built at Berkeley to be used on top of TinyOS
called TinySec [2], which is based on implementing linklayer security on the level of packets. This protocol provides
a way for authenticating and encrypting packets, focusing
on the use of an Initialization Vector to enhance the
encryption technique, but does not put forth a new keying
mechanism and instead implements security on a one-hop
level. In the provided implementation, the researchers use a
pre-deployed network-wide key. In terms of our research,
this mechanism is not viable or efficient, and the level of
security it can assure is questionable since the capture of a
single node can break down the entire network.
Research attempts into utilizing public key
cryptographic systems in wireless sensor networks began,
and one suggested protocol to utilize public keys is built on
top of TinySec under the name TinyPK [3]. It necessitates
the presence of two entities other than the sensor nodes, a
Certification Authority (CA) and an External Party (EP),
having more powerful resources, and having a pair of
public/private keys, while the CA’s public key is pre-

configured into the nodes. The EP signs its public key with
the CA’s private key and sends it to the nodes, which can
verify it and obtain the EP’s public key. Nodes can then
generate a session key, encrypt it with the EP’s public key
and share the session key with the EP, establishing
symmetric security with the exchanged key. The issues with
regard to this protocol is the need for two extra entities that
have more functionalities to be able to maintain all the
node’s keys and manage the public key system, as these
entities are not always available in regular sensor networks.
Also, the protocol does not appropriately handle
compromised private keys and node-to-node communication
also relies on the EP as a middle-man. The most recent work
in wireless sensor network security is [4] which is able to
provide a better level of security than TinySec with lower
energy consumption. PIKE [5] employs the use of
intermediary nodes as trusted sources to securely establish
shared keys. As for [6], the authors provide a secure and
energy-efficient way of performing data aggregation in
sensor networks.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2
provides a detailed explanation of our algorithm, including
our intended goals and design. The mathematical analysis of
our protocol is in Section 3. Section 4 presents our
simulation results and a comparison with the security
protocol in TinyPK [3], and we conclude this paper in
Section 5.

2 Design and Framework
We start with a brief abstract idea of the algorithm
before going into the details of every phase. The protocol
identifies three types of possible entities participating in the
network: a Base Station, clusterheads, and regular nodes.
The Base Station is assumed to be secure against all kinds of
attacks and has much more powerful resources than other
nodes in the network, which is a valid assumption used in
other references such as [4][6]. Clusterheads are identical in
hardware formation to all other nodes in the network, but
their selection process depends on them having the most
capabilities at that time (Section III.C.4). Each node is
identified by a 2-byte ID, stored in it prior to deployment,
along with a 4-byte authenticator, which is stored in the
Base Station as well, to allow integrity checking for
nodes.For the cryptography aspect of the protocol, we
summarize here the general algorithms used, whereas the
detailed analysis involved with each mechanism is analyzed
later. As an overview, for symmetric operations, we
adopted RC2, as it is fast and requires a 56-bit key only. As
for encrypting or decrypting with the node’s authenticator,
the authenticator is doubled into 8 bytes and used as the key
within an implementation of the DES mechanism. For the
asymmetric encryption/ decryption processes, we opted to
use Elliptic Curve algorithms, as opposed to RSA, because
analysis showed that it does faster computations and can use
a smaller-size key (112 bits) [2][7]. As for integrity
checking, we use a MAC-like checksum for every

transmitted packet, which amounts to 4 bytes; the data that
this checksum is applied to varies with each type of packet
depending on the required validation. This type of MAC is
chosen because it is capable of providing the needed data
validation without large packet overhead or increased source
code requirements. Note that keys in the whole protocol are
generated only once, and used for all transmissions after
that. However, the algorithm might decide that new keys
must be generated because of the change in a clusterhead,
for example.
1- Establishing the Key between the Clusterhead and
Nodes in the cluster: The agreed-upon fact is that public key
algorithms are computationally expensive, and so energydraining; thus, not all nodes can be expected to perform such
operations, which would lead to great energy requirements
and the death of nodes in relatively short time. Therefore,
the communication within clusters is done by way of
symmetric keys, known to be secure and require fewer
computations. The restrictions imposed by regular
symmetric protocols are the initial establishment of secret
keys between any two nodes in a secure manner, as well as
the need to store several keys in a single node to enable its
communication with other nodes. The algorithm in this
phase aims to solve these issues. Initially, the Base Station
has a pair of public/private keys, and assuming that the
clusters are established in the network, it broadcasts its
public key to all the clusterheads. Then, each clusterhead has
to establish a set of keys with the member nodes of its
cluster. For each node, the clusterhead generates a random
secret key, includes its authenticator, its own ID, and the ID
of the node it wishes to use this secret key with. All this data
is encrypted with the Base Station’s public key, and if this
key is not available in it, it can request the public key from
the Base Station. The packet then is appended with the Base
Station’s ID, to allow intermediate nodes to forward it, and
the necessary MAC, computed over the symmetric key, the
CH’s ID and authenticator, and the ID of the intended node
(all data before encryption). The packet is broadcasted, since
no routing protocol is in use here (even though a routing
protocol can be added), and recipient nodes continue to
broadcast until the packet reaches the Base Station. The
Base Station then decrypts the data, using its private key,
and computes the checksum to validate that the received data
has not been tampered with. If the integrity check passes, the
BS compares the received authenticator with the one listed
with the sender’s ID in its list of nodes. If the authenticator
does not match, the message is discarded, as the sender is
assumed to be insecure. When the sender is assured to be
reliable, the Base Station forms a packet consisting of the
key, its ID, and the sending CH’s ID, encrypted with the
receiving node’s authenticator, and appends the recipient
node’s ID, also to allow the proper forwarding. A MAC is
computed over this entire data and added to the packet.
When the packet reaches the intended node, it decrypts it
using its authenticator, and recognizes the ID of its

clusterhead and the secret key that is to be used for all later
communications with this clusterhead. Note that a node
cannot communicate securely with other nodes unless the
data is routed through the clusterhead; this will be further
explained in a later section. By repeating these same steps
for all the nodes declared to be members of a clusterhead’s
group, secret symmetric keys will be established between the
clusterhead and these nodes, and are maintained in the
clusterhead. The node, on the other hand, only has to
maintain this single key to enable its communication with its
clusterhead. For this phase, both asymmetric and symmetric
algorithms are used. The CH encrypts the generated key
with the Base Station’s public key, and uses Elliptic Curve
encryption on the data packet, whereas the Base Station
decrypts using its private key and Elliptic Curve decryption.
The generated key in the clusterhead is a symmetric key
established by RC2 mechanism, which the clusterhead and
the corresponding node can use for communication from that
point on. As for the transmission of this key from the Base
Station to the node, it is encrypted with the node’s
authenticator, listed in the Base Station and in the node itself
since deployment, providing a symmetric mechanism that
the node can decrypt with. The authenticator is used as a
symmetric key using the DES encryption/decryption
algorithm, thereby allowing both the Base Station and the
node to apply it for the needed cryptographic operations.
2Establishing
Communication
between
Two
Clusterheads: Clusterheads are the designated leaders in the
disjoint groups within the network, so transmissions from
and to the nodes in any cluster have to pass through the
corresponding clusterheads. Thus, to enable secure
communication between different clusters, we must enable
secure communication between their clusterheads. For this
case, symmetric keys cannot be used, because clusterheads
are established dynamically, and may be rotated throughout
the lifetime of the network. Because of the choice of
clusterheads in the network, we allow these leaders to
perform public key operations, not only with the Base
Station (as in the first part of the protocol), but also with
fellow clusterheads. Upon election, clusterheads generate a
pair of public/private keys to use in the EC system, so when
a clusterhead wishes to communicate with another, it
requests the recipient’s public key, encrypts any data to be
sent with it, and broadcasts it on route to the receiving
clusterhead. This latter can asymmetrically decrypt the data,
and in doing so can now capture secure data from another
Clusterhead.
3- Establishing Communication between Two Nodes: Now
that the previous part enabled uncompromised exchange
between clusterheads, this phase can explore the steps of
putting forth a safe technique for node-to-node
communication. For any two nodes Ni and Nj, wishing to
share data, regardless of whether the two nodes are in the
same cluster or not, the nodes have to transmit the data
through their assigned clusterheads. First, Ni encrypts its

message with the symmetric key it shares with the
clusterhead (determined in 1st part); note that this operation
is computationally simple and non-expensive for a regular
node. Ni also encrypts its own ID and the ID of the recipient
node, appends the clusterhead’s ID, and computes a MAC
over the entire packet. It then sends the encrypted message
to the clusterhead – say Ci – which checks to determine if
the receiving node is part of this cluster or not. In case it is,
the clusterhead must decrypt the message and re-encrypt it
with the symmetric key appointed to the node that is to
obtain this data. Otherwise, the clusterhead has to forward it
to the leader of another group that contains the sought-after
node. The sender side’s clusterhead decrypts the data
symmetrically, then sends an initial message containing the
recipient node’s ID. As in all broadcast transmissions, nodes
continue to forward this message until it is stopped by a
relevant node, which in this case is the clusterhead of the
group including Nj. Once the remote clusterhead – call it Cj –
detects that the message is meant for a node in its vicinity
(from the list of nodes in its cluster), it sends back its public
key to Ci, allowing them to communicate. Ci then encrypts
the message from Ni with Cj’s public key and transmits it in
the same way. When it is delivered to Cj , it decrypts it with
its local private key, then encrypts it with the required node
shared key and forwards the message to it, along with the
initial sender’s ID. Naturally, Nj is now able to acquire the
message by decrypting with its secret key.
4- Clusterhead Hand-Off: Several existing clustering
protocols - e.g. LEACH [7] - advise that clusterheads should
be rotated to maintain the highest level of battery power
possible. For our protocol, any clustering algorithm can be
used, but our concern is maintaining the security even during
the clusterhead rotation. In general, for a clusterhead to give
over its responsibility to another node in its neighborhood, it
has to deliver its shared keys to the newly-chosen node.
However, to keep up the level of security, these shared keys
cannot be continuously used by all clusterheads as that
implies the exposure of the keys to several nodes in the
neighborhood endangering confidentiality. So, for safe
clusterhead rotation to take place, we propose that the
resigning CH send its list of node shared keys to the newlychosen CH, encrypted with that CH’s public key (CHs are
required to generate public/private key pairs as soon as they
are elected). The new clusterhead can decrypt this list but it
cannot use them for its communications; instead, it generates
a new list of secret keys for the nodes in the cluster
(including the old CH), and then delivers them to their
corresponding nodes encrypted with the old shared keys.
Thus, the keys established by the resigning CH are used
once by the new CH, only to inform the nodes of the new
shared keys. Upon reception of these messages, the nodes
can remove the old keys and replace them with the new, for
these will be the ones used for communication from that
point on. As for the old CH, which does not have a previous
symmetric key, the new CH can send it a generated shared

key encrypted with its public key, so it performs an
asymmetric operation to get its new symmetric key, and
proceeds to behave as a regular node in the group. In this
way, the clusterhead has been rotated to maximize energy
usage, and the rotation was done locally without any
interference from the Base Station. The flowchart of SHESP
is presented in Fig. 1.

their authenticators as symmetric keys when it needs secure
communication with them. So, for an n-node network, it will
need to maintain (2+4) n bytes of IDs and authenticators (2byte IDs, 4-byte authenticators), in addition to its pair of
public/private keys, which are 44 bytes each (88 bytes in
ECC). The clusterhead is also required to maintain
information about the nodes in its cluster, namely their IDs
and the generated secret keys. The secret keys generated by
RC2 are 56 bits long, so for a neighborhood of k nodes, each
clusterhead has storage of (2+7) k bytes (2-byte IDs, 7-byte
keys), in addition to its own ID, authenticator and
public/private keys for a total of 94 bytes (2 + 4 + 88). As
for the nodes, they are only requested to maintain their own
IDs, authenticators, and shared key with their respective
clusterheads, resulting in a total of 13 bytes (2 + 4 + 7) in
each node. Obviously, the storage requirements are within
reason and capabilities of the nodes, even in the case of
clusterheads, because of the assumption that the number of
neighbors in a single cluster is limited.
Analysis of the Security Implications
The algorithm as applied ensures data confidentiality,
authenticity, and integrity as well as resilience to some
attacks against the security of the network.

Fig 2. Flowchart of the protocol–entities between brackets are
encrypted with the subscript mechanism

3 Analysis of SHESP
In this section, we go through the phases of the security
protocol, presenting detailed analysis of the algorithms used
and the induced expenses in terms of storage, computational
overhead, time, and energy. Basically, our aim is to evaluate
the energy required for each of the primary operations: send,
receive, and compute. The energy overhead is rated (in
Mica2 motes) at 1µJ for sending one bit, 0.5µJ for receiving
one bit, and 5 nJ (0.005 µJ) for processing a single
instruction [8]. We calculate the memory, time, and thereby
energy needed for each of the basic operations described in
the phases above.
Analysis of the Storage Requirements
Here, we evaluate what must be maintained in each node for
use in the protocol, i.e. keys and information about other
nodes in the network. The Base Station is the focus point of
the network, and considering that it is capable of holding
large amounts of information and has enough energy to
maintain it for long periods of time, we’re not concerned
with minimizing expenditures on the Base Station’s side.
The Base Station saves the IDs of all the nodes in the
network and their corresponding authenticators, but it is not
required to store any keys related to the nodes, since it uses

1- Data Confidentiality: This metric is ensured through the
keying mechanism used and the use of strong
encryption algorithms. In the first phase, the symmetric
key established between every node and its clusterhead
cannot be detected. The packet transmitted from a
clusterhead to the base station is encrypted with the base
station’s public key and the only way to recover the
packet is through the base station’s private key which is
only maintained by the base station itself. The packet is
then delivered from the base station to the node
encrypted with the node’s authenticator, which is predeployed and never transmitted across the network. As
for the packet transmission from one clusterhead to
another, it is also achieved with public-key
cryptography using the receiving clusterhead’s public
key. Also, for a clusterhead to communicate with a node
in its own cluster, the established symmetric key is used
to encrypt messages, and since the key was exchanged
safely, then this too is a secure operation. Data
confidentiality is also ensured through the use of strong
encryption algorithms combining both symmetric and
asymmetric key cryptography.
2- Data Integrity: Our algorithm ensures data integrity.
Data integrity means that data has not been tampered
with. This is ensured through the use of message
authentication codes (MAC). The receiver drops a
packet if the MAC generated over the packet is different
than the MAC appended to the message. We choose a 4byte MAC, which is proven to be robust against brute

force attacks. With a 4-byte MAC, an attacker has to
generate 232 packets in the worst case, if he is to attempt
to pose as a secure node and send data with a forged
MAC. On average, he needs to send 231 packets. It is
important to realize that brute forcing a MAC cannot be
done offline, since the only way to decide whether the
brute force attack is successful is by sending the
message to the node. With conventional networks,
where the bandwidth can reach up to 1Mbps, this
method is not a problem. However, with an average of
19.2 kbps in a sensor network, sending 231 packets
would require more than 20 months, a period during
which battery-operated nodes would already be dead
[2].
3- Data Authenticity: Data authenticity requires that the
data come from a proper and secure source. An attacker
who would want to fabricate its own message should
fabricate its associated MAC as well. However, the
attacker lacks the required MAC-generating function.
Also, considering that the MAC is generated over the
plain-text data (prior to encryption), the MAC function
cannot be deduced from inspecting messages during
transit, making the MAC forgery even more difficult.
Messages with invalid MACs would thus be exposed
and dropped. We already argued that brute-forcing a
MAC is not feasible.
4- Protection against Routing Attacks: A common attack
is for the attacker to change the destination of a packet
in transit or its source. We already encrypt the id of the
source node, so having an attacker alter it is not
possible. Though the id of the destination node is not
encrypted, yet a MAC is applied to the whole packet
including the id of the destination node. Thus, if an
attacker alters this field, the receiver would not accept
the packet since the regenerated MAC and the one
appended would not match.
5- Protection against Sybil Attacks: In a Sybil attack, an
attacker sends messages with different virtual identities
and locations, thus claiming to be multiple nodes.
Without cryptographic authentication, a receiver of a
message cannot determine the true identity of its
originator, and does not know how many of the claimed
identities are truly existent and unique [9]. Our
algorithm is resilient to Sybil attacks only after the
clusters have been formed, since each node would
already know its clusterhead, the only node with which
it communicates, and each clusterhead has a list of the
nodes that belong to it. Still an attacker can pose itself
as a neighbor node since the node ids are public.
However, no packet is sent from a node without a form
of authentication. Since the attacker is neither aware of
the key to be used for encryption nor the authentication
mechanism used, all packets it sends would be
neglected.

6- Protection against Selective Forwarding Attacks: An
attacker can use compromised nodes to launch selective
forwarding attacks, in which compromised intermediate
nodes selectively drop data traffic passing through them
and thus severely jeopardize data availability. Our
approach adopts a one-to-many data forwarding
approach through the use of broadcasting. Thus, if an
attacker drops a packet by way of selective forwarding,
this same packet would still reach its destination via
other routes passing through non-compromised nodes.
7- Analysis of the Mobility Implications: Our protocol
continues to work as expected in case of mobility. The
only effect mobility imposes on our algorithm is the
changes introduced for the clustering. In case a node
changes its position and moves out of range from its
assigned clusterhead, it should inform its clusterhead
(before moving) of its decision, and the clusterhead can
accordingly remove its shared key from the list.
Afterwards, the node must join another cluster. With an
advertisement message, it can alert another clusterhead
to its presence, and then the clusterhead can simply
generate a new shared key for it and establish the
symmetric connection via the Base Station. Another
case occurs if the clusterhead becomes mobile, which
should not happen often because of the mobility metric
integrated into the clusterhead election process, and this
is handled in the same manner with which the
clusterhead handles the reduction in energy. The node
with the most capabilities within the cluster is selected
to be the new clusterhead and can generate new keys
and distribute them securely to all member nodes using
their old symmetric keys. The original clusterhead
becomes a regular node and can join any other cluster.

4 Simulation Results
To evaluate the performance of our security protocol, we
implemented SHESP in JProwler, a Java-based simulator
intended for sensor networks. We created a network of 100
nodes, divided into 10 clusters, and a base station, where
each cluster contains a clusterhead and 9 non-clusterhead
nodes. In our experiments, we simulate sending data
between a source and a target node and study the effect of
increasing the spatial separation between them on the
incurred energy expenses and the end-to-end time delay. We
assume only one sender transmitting a single data packet.
The basic data message is 11 bytes long, and it is expanded
into a packet of different sizes. We measure the energy
consumed by the entire network till the data reaches the
target node. In both graphs shown below, we do not
consider the energy needed for the clusterheads to generate
their public and private keys since this is done only once for
every clusterhead. We consider five test cases. In the first
case, the sending and receiving nodes belong to the same

bandwidth characteristics are nearly identical to those
without using a security protocol considering that the
overhead resulting from clustering and establishing the keys
are neglected which will only be done once upon
deployment. With fewer senders, channel contention is less
of an issue, so the packet length overhead does not affect the
throughput. Comparing with TinyPK, the resulting
bandwidth is better in SHESP due to the resulting overhead
encountered in using TinyPK.
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cluster. The remaining four have the nodes belonging to two
different clusters with increasing spatial separation. The
protocols used for comparison purposes are: (1) a network
applying no security protocol, i.e. pure broadcasting, (2) a
network applying the TinyPK security protocol [3].
The first no-security protocol helps in showing the
overhead
incurred
purely
from
enabling
encryption/decryption operations. The messages exchanged
are exactly the same as those done in SHESP, so the
forwarding overhead is similar except in packet sizes, which
are also affected by cryptographic operations. As for
TinyPK [3], we chose to compare this security protocol with
ours since it also employs public-key operations to establish
a symmetric secure channel between any node in the
network and an external party (or a base station).
Fig. 2 displays the energy expenditure over all the
nodes in the network relative to the spatial separation
between the source and target nodes. The figure shows the
variation in energy consumption between the different
network setups. Our protocol induces a decrease in energy
usage due to the optimized required cryptographic
operations, so the witnessed decrease in energy relative to
TinyPK will prolong the overall lifetime of the system.
Compared to the non-security protocols, the minor increase
in energy usage is expected due to the extra computational
usage of encryption. We notice that the energy expenditure
in SHESP over the entire network does not exceed 0.1J for a
single data exchange. Considering that our network is made
up of 100 nodes and each node has around 2.5J of energy as
it starts out, then the network as a whole has 250J of
available energy. If we were to measure the life expectancy
of the sensor network based on these results, we can
estimate that it can provide on the order of a thousand data
exchanges, taking into consideration the energy needed to
establish the clusters and the symmetric keys. Note that the
energy results given are excluding those needed for
establishing the public keys for the CHs and corresponding
clusters, which is done once upon deployment. Fig. 3 shows
the total time delay incurred between the sending of the
message at the source node and its reception at the target
node. The results show that the delay is comparable to that
induced in the non-secure approach. The difference in the
delay can be accounted to the time needed to perform the
cryptographic operations. However, the difference is greater
compared to TinyPK and that shows the strength of SHESP.
To measure the maximum throughput when using SHESP,
we computed the total number of packets that could be sent
in a 60 second time period. In this experiment, we
configured a network of nodes so that multiple nodes would
simultaneously transmit as rapidly as possible. Since the
number of senders affects the channel utilization, we varied
the number of senders. This allows us to characterize the
throughput at different regimes. We sent 11 bytes of
application data using the SHESP, TinyPK, and with no
security protocol. We measured the number of packets that
were successfully received. The results are in Fig. 4. SHESP

TinyPK
No Security

0

5Number of Senders
10

Fig 4. Bandwidth as a function of send-receive pairs

15

4 Conclusions

Fig 5. Total energy and delay incurred due to establishing the
symmetric key in a single node in the network (in SHESP and
TinyPK). The results are an average of 5 simulation runs.

Both SHESP and TinyPK undergo a key establishment
phase during the initial network deployment, where each
node is given a symmetric key to share either with its
clusterhead (in SHESP) or the External Party (in TinyPK).
We present in Fig. 5 the energy and time consumed to
establish the symmetric key in a single node in the network.
Here, we notice the difference between our protocol and
TinyPK: SHESP shows dramatic savings both in energy
consumption and time. This is mostly due to the adopted
asymmetric algorithm in our protocol, where Elliptic Curve
has been proven to be superior to RSA (algorithm used in
TinyPK), in both computation time and energy.
TinyPK establishes node-to-node communication by
routing the packet through the External Party, which
introduces unnecessary delay when the communicating
nodes are in the same vicinity. An important primitive in
securing sensor networks is data integrity, which ensures
that data has not been tampered with. Security practices
have shown that using encryption without authentication is
insecure [2]. SHESP provides high data integrity in all cases
and for all packets in transit. However, TinyPK does not
ensure data integrity in packets sent from node to node
(through the EP), nor in packets from a node to the EP
informing it of the symmetric key to be established, since it
does not enforce the use of any authentication code. Thus,
the symmetric key can be easily altered by an attacker, and
the symmetric keys maintained at the node and the EP
would no longer match. This would impose time delays and
energy waste before the error can be caught, and the node
would have to send the packet all over again to the EP
which is always exposed to the same attack. The only packet
by which TinyPK includes a MAC to enforce data integrity
is when the EP sends a node its public key. This clearly
violates what most papers in the field of security argue as
the most important primitive in sensor networks. SHESP
provides data authenticity (ensuring secure source) by
applying a MAC on the packet before encryption, making it
more efficient. However, the current implementation of
TinyPK does not ensure data authenticity.

The protocol proposed in this paper provides the ability to
employ the benefits of both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic operations to establish an acceptable level of
security in wireless sensor networks. The main purpose was
to make use of public key cryptography to put in place a
secure symmetric exchange of data, thus providing security
at a reasonable cost. The division of the network into
clusters is also essential in making the protocol more
energy-efficient, more scalable, and more resilient to
attacks.
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